







HISTORICALLY, LATIN AMERICAN pension systems were designed follow-
ing a social insurance model geared toward offering pension benefits to
formal-sector workers. From 1981, and especially over the 1990s, several
countries implemented structural pension reforms to introduce privately
administered individual accounts that more closely linked individual ben-
efits to past contributions (Mesa-Lago 2004). By design, these systems
excluded the redistribution of pension resources among workers and
pensioners, promoting individual savings instead. In several countries, the
contribution records required to receive a minimum pension from the
social security system left ineligible most informal-sector workers, as well
as agricultural-sector workers and unpaid family workers. As a result, the
reformed pension systems suffered from persistently low levels of coverage,
and a large share of older adults had no access to a pension.
In more recent years, in a context of economic growth and changing
ideas and political balances, several Latin American countries have imple-
mented policies to extend economic protection to older adults who could
not obtain a pension in the contributory system. Some countries reformed
pension systems that had been privatized in the previous decade (including
cases of reform reversals, as in Argentina). Many countries also promoted
the expansion of noncontributory pensions for older adults and persons
with disabilities or made access to contributory pensions more flexible for
some types of workers (Arza 2013; Arza and Knox-Vydmanov 2017; Bosch,
Melguizo, and Pagés 2013; Palacios and Knox-Vydmanov 2014; Rofman,
Apella, and Vezza 2013). These policies were part of a wider process of wel-
fare expansion in other areas of social protection, which involved greater
social expenditures and more social assistance benefits (Barrientos 2011).
This article evaluates the patterns of old-age protection in Latin
America after recent expansions of basic pension coverage. It characterizes
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noncontributory pensions and related programs oriented to offer benefits
to older adults lacking a record of formal employment and contributions.
It is based on the systematic study of the design features of these policies in
14 Latin American countries, and relies on various data sources, including
quantitative data (mainly from IDB 2017 and CEPAL 2017a), comparative
databases of noncontributory pensions’ design features (CEPAL 2017b,
HelpAge International 2015), secondary sources, and official data from
countries to complement and update other sources. This article first dis-
cusses the need and opportunities for pension coverage expansion in Latin
America, referring to pension coverage deficits and the window of oppor-
tunity for dealing with them in the past two decades. Second, it documents
existing programs that offer cash benefits to older adults not qualifying for
contributory pension benefits and identifies different strategies and policy
instruments across countries. Finally, the article explores the cross-country
differences in living arrangements and retirement choices of older adults,
indicators of the interactions between states, markets, and families in
providing economic security in old age.
Inequality, informal work, and population
aging: The need and opportunity for pension
coverage expansion
Socioeconomic inequality in Latin America is very high and involves earn-
ings inequality as well as unequal access to formal employment, social se-
curity, and social services. In most countries, the majority of low-income
workers are in the informal labor force, have no access to contributory so-
cial security benefits and limited access to social protection at all. Thus,
a large share of the population of Latin America lacks what scholars
have called the “double incorporation” (Martínez-Franzoni and Sánchez-
Ancochea 2014)—i.e., incorporation both into the formal labor force and
into the social protection system.
As has been widely documented, many older adults have no right
to a contributory pension. Structural pension reforms implemented first
in Chile in 1981 and in several other Latin American countries over the
1990s and early 2000s have not solved this problem. These reforms estab-
lished privately administered individual accounts as a key component of
the mandatory pension system, to substitute for or operate jointly with the
public earnings-related system. Variations of this model were implemented
in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic,
El Salvador, Mexico, Panana, Peru, and Uruguay (Mesa-Lago 2004, 2006,
2012a; Madrid 2002).
The reformed pension systems did not perform well. Coverage re-
mained low, and there were concerns in some countries that benefits for
many covered workers—especially those with interrupted work histories
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or low earnings—would be too low (see e.g., Pension Commission 2006 on
the Chilean case). This encouraged governments to introduce new mea-
sures, and some countries (like Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile) implemented
post-privatization pension reforms that in different ways enhanced the role
of the state in old-age protection (Kritzer, Kay, and Sinha 2011; Bertra-
nou, Calvo, and Bertranou 2009; Mesa-Lago 2012b; Mesa-Lago and Ossio
Bustillos 2012). Many countries also started a process of expanding pension
coverage, by developing new noncontributory pension programs or by ex-
tending existing programs to provide economic support to older adults not
covered by the contributory pension system.
A positive macroeconomic and fiscal context, in an international envi-
ronment of high commodity prices, was favourable for the growth of public
social expenditures in general, and social assistance programs in particular.
On average, social expenditures in Latin America rose from 14.7 percent to
18.8 percent of the gross domestic product between 1998–1999 and 2012–
2013, and the share of social to total public expenditures increased over
the same period, from 53.8 percent to 64.8 percent (CEPAL 2014). A politi-
cal and ideological shift away from market-based orthodoxy toward greater
state intervention also provided the political context for expanding cash
benefits in several countries. The number of governments situated to the left
of center on the political spectrum (notwithstanding their differences) in-
creased (Huber and Stephens 2012). The expansionary trend also went be-
yond left-of-center governments. In the case of Mexico, for instance, initia-
tives from progressive forces in local governments and the opposition were
relevant in placing these policies within the political debate and eventually
encouraged their implementation at the federal level under a government
with a different political orientation (see Willmore 2014). Noncontributory
pensions started to be promoted by various relevant actors (including in-
ternational organizations, notably through the International Labour Orga-
nization’s [ILO] Social Protection Floor Initiative; see ILO 2011, 2012) and,
just as happened with conditional cash transfer programs, it became clear
that noncontributory pensions could reach many people, involve relatively
limited budgets, and enjoy popular support.
Coverage expansion also happened in a context of population aging.
On average, the share of the population aged 65 and older reached 7.5 per-
cent in 2015 and is projected to rise to almost 25 percent by 2065 (CEPAL
2017c). In some countries, such as Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, the ag-
ing process is more advanced, with the population aged 65 and older al-
ready representing more than 10 percent of the total population. As the
share of the elderly population increases, pension coverage and adequacy
are likely to becomemore central public policy issues. For instance, in coun-
tries with underdeveloped pension systems characterized by low coverage,
the aging process can put greater pressures on younger generations in the
family, as fewer children may have to provide economic support for parents
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(and sometimes grandparents) who lack a pension. On the fiscal side, the
impact of population aging on pension financing (a key concern in more
advanced economies) varies across Latin American countries, depending
on how advanced the aging process is, as well as on the level of pension
coverage and the generosity of benefits.
The expansion of noncontributory pension coverage occurred in the
context of these shared needs and opportunities. High levels of socioe-
conomic inequality and informal work and the inability of contributory
systems and pension reforms to guarantee broad coverage, as well as
changes in the socioeconomic and political context, were the scenario
in which new basic old-age pension programs developed and expanded.
However, not all Latin American countries expanded coverage similarly,
and progress remains limited in some. In addition, as we will see, countries
that implemented policies to expand the coverage of older adults opted for
a variety of specific policy instruments, with differences in aims, reach, and
generosity.
Policy design and policy instruments across
countries
The expansion of old-age pension coverage occurred in countries with a va-
riety of pension systems—public Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) systems, privately
administered individual accounts, and mixed or parallel systems in which
individual accounts coexist with public pensions. While coverage expan-
sion strategies varied across countries in kind and scope, they all shared a
key feature: the creation or expansion of programs offering old-age benefits
that did not require a record of past contributions as a condition for access
(Rofman, Apella, and Vezza 2013; Arza 2013; Arza and Knox-Vydmanov
2017). Table 1 lists the most important of these policies in Latin Amer-
ica. Noncontributory pensions—also referred to as “social pensions”—are
“regular government provided cash transfers to older people” (Palacios and
Knox-Vydmanov 2014, 251) that are not linked to past contributions. For
that reason, they are labeled “noncontributory,” and that common usage
is followed here, although some key basic pension programs analyzed in
this article are partly financed through contributions and administered as
part of the general pension system (such as the rural pension in Brazil or
the pension moratorium in Argentina, described below).1 In most cases,
noncontributory pensions target the elderly poor. In others, these programs
have wider reach and aim to cover, on their own or in combination with
contributory benefits, the entire population of older adults. Some benefits
are integrated with the contributory pension system, but others are separate
programs that work more as poor relief for the impoverished aged than as
retirement benefits.
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TABLE 1 Background information on noncontributory benefits and other
coverage expansion programs for older adults in Latin America
Program Targeting
Argentina Noncontributory pension program Means-tested
Pension Moratorium Not means-tested
Universal pension for older adults
(PUAM)
Pension-tested
Bolivia Renta Universal de Vejez “Renta
Dignidad” (previously Bonosol)
Universal
Brazil Benefício de Prestação Continuada (BPC)
(Continuous benefit program)
Means-tested
Rural Pension (Previdência Rural) Not means-tested (small
farmers and subsistence
fishermen)
Chile Basic Solidarity Pension for Old Age
(previously PASIS)
Means-tested
Colombia Colombia Mayor (previously PPSAM) Means-tested
Costa Rica Noncontributory pension scheme by
basic amount (Régimen no contributivo
de pensiones por monto básico)
Means-tested
Ecuador Pension for elderly and pension for
persons with disability (human
development grant program)
Means-tested




Guatemala Economic support for the older adult
(Aporte Economico del Adulto Mayor)
Means-tested
Mexico Pension for the elderly (previously
“70 and over” program)
Pension-tested
Program of food support for adults
over 68 years old living in Mexico
City
Universal (only Mexico City
residents)
Panama 120 at 65: Special program for
economic assistance of older adults
(previously 100 at 70)
Means-tested
Paraguay Food pensions for elderly in a situation
of poverty
Means-tested
Peru National solidarity assistance program
“Pension 65”
Means-tested
Uruguay Noncontributory pension for old age
and disability
Means-tested
NOTE: Some programs included in this table also cover persons with disabilities. Programs and features by
c. 2017.
SOURCE: Elaborated by the author based on CEPAL (2017b) and Arza (2017a).
Rofman, Apella, and Vezza (2013, 10) made an important contribu-
tion in documenting the expansion of noncontributory pension benefits in
Latin America. They identified two strategies that countries have adopted
to expand coverage: the expansion of traditional contributory pension
systems, and the development of poverty reduction programs targeted
at older adults. To offer a taxonomy of noncontributory pensions, the
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authors compared some of their key design features, specifically looking at
whether benefits were: (1) universal or means-tested; (2) integrated with
or independent from contributory systems; (3) permanent or temporary;
(4) implemented gradually or immediately; and (5) managed by existing
or new institutions (ibid., 38–43; see also Rofman, Apella, and Vezza
2015).
In linewith that approach, this article aims tomove further in the anal-
ysis by jointly evaluating a number of dimensions that characterize coun-
tries’ old-age coverage strategies, including benefit adequacy and the rela-
tive role given to contributory and noncontributory benefits. To do this, it
considers five main dimensions: (i) the basic benefit amount; (ii) the total
old-age coverage rate; (iii) the contributory pension coverage rate; (iv) the
noncontributory pension coverage rate; and (v) the eligibility condition for
noncontributory benefits (means-tested or non means-tested). On the basis
of these five dimensions, Table 2 conceptualizes three alternative strategies
for old-age coverage, each combining a particular set of outcomes in the five
dimensions. To fit in each model, countries are expected to have a combi-
nation of features—i.e., to present a particular value in each indicator, as
described in Table 2.
The empirical analysis, which uses the most recent data available at
the time of writing, allows the classification of 14 Latin American countries
into three groups based on the framework outlined above. The first strategy,
labeled “Contributory Plus,” was implemented in Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
and Uruguay. It characterizes countries that have comparatively high cover-
age rates in the contributory pension system and that use a variety of instru-
ments (means-tested benefits, flexibility for access, rural pensions) to reach
close-to-full coverage. The benefits these countries offer to workers outside
the formal labor market are relatively more generous than (or at least not
as low as) those of other Latin American noncontributory schemes.
The second strategy, labeled “Universal Minimal,” characterizes coun-
tries that have low contributory pension coverage and universal or pension-
tested schemes with broad coverage and modest benefits (Bolivia and Mex-
ico). Finally, the third strategy involves countries with a more residual ap-
proach to old-age protection, that fit in a “Means-Tested Poverty Relief”
model. These are countries with low contributory pension coverage rates,
which extended the coverage of older adults with noncontributory ben-
efits that are low, means-tested, and separate from the contributory sys-
tem. Total old-age coverage in this group ranges from low (in El Salvador
and Guatemala) to mid-range (in Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Peru),
mainly because of variable efforts in the development of noncontributory
pensions, and in all cases a considerable share of the elderly has no bene-
fits. Two countries (Panama and Costa Rica) are situated between this group
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Contributory plus
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay currently have the highest contribu-
tory pension coverage in Latin America. In Argentina, total coverage rates
increased from 69 percent to 91 percent of the population aged 65 and over
between 2005 and 2015 (IDB 2017). Not all of these benefits were fully
contributory, however, and the increase in coverage rates reported above
was largely the outcome of a “pension moratorium” that made contributory
requirements for getting a pension more flexible (Arza 2012a; Arza 2013;
Danani and Hintze 2011; Rofman, Fajnzylber, and Herrera 2010). This pro-
gram made older adults who lacked the contribution records needed for a
normal retirement benefit also eligible to a pension. From the new benefit, a
monthly deduction was made to compensate for the contributions missing.
Open to all, the pension moratorium produced a massive increase in cover-
age rates, especially among women (Arza 2017b). By 2015, pensions paid
to older adults who joined the moratorium represented about 47 percent
of all pensions paid,3 and the benefit amount was normally close to the
legal minimum pension. In 2016, a pension reform created the Universal
Pension for Older Adults (PUAM, for the acronym in Spanish), a pension-
tested benefit for older adults with no other pension, which progressively
replaces the pension moratorium as the policy instrument to incorporate
older adults lacking contributory benefits.
The Argentine strategy for coverage expansion had two key features.
First, older adults not previously covered were incorporated into the same
pension system as formal workers, and shared with them the rights to
regular benefit indexation and health insurance. This contrasted with the
most common strategy in other countries, which was to create a separate
noncontributory pension program to incorporate the “outsiders.” In fact, a
separate noncontributory social assistance pension program also existed in
Argentina (Bertranou, Solorio, and van Ginneken 2002), but most older
adults availed themselves of the pension moratorium instead, because the
conditions were better. Second, the pension moratorium was conceived
as a temporary measure (workers could use it only to compensate for past
years of informal work performed up until 1993, and later extended to
2003). In terms of financing, the pension moratorium involved a relatively
high share of the budget compared with noncontributory pension programs
in the region. This was because, unlike those programs, the moratorium
also included older adults with some contribution records, and paid more
and higher benefits. It was feasible in a context of growing social security
revenues and the nationalization of individual pension accounts in 2008,
which redirected all workers’ contributions and accumulated pension funds
to the national social security administration (Arza 2012b).
In the case of Chile, one of the aims of the 2008 pension reform was to
improve the protection of the population not covered by the contributory
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system (Arenas de Mesa 2010; Berstein et al. 2009; Rofman, Fajnzylber,
and Herrera 2010). The reform created the Basic Solidarity Pension for Old-
age (PBSV, for the acronym in Spanish) to provide benefits for older adults
who had no other pensions and who belonged to the lowest 60 percent of
households in terms of income. It currently covers about 29 percent of the
elderly population (IDB 2017). The same reform also created the Solidarity
Pension Contribution for Old-age, a noncontributory pension supplement
for older adults with some pension savings but low benefits. It is estimated
that contributory and noncontributory pensions jointly reached about 90
percent of older adults in 2015 (IDB 2017). Benefits were established as
rights for all those meeting eligibility conditions, with no quotas or waiting
lists. The PBSV is, however, relatively low—the lowest basic benefit amount
in the Contributory Plus group, and well below the basic pension in Brazil
or Argentina.
In Brazil and Uruguay, coverage rates were already high 20 years ago.
In the case of Brazil, this wide-ranging social security system was part of
new social rights established in the Federal Constitution of 1988. By the
mid-1990s, the old-age coverage rate was (as in Uruguay) already above
80 percent, and in 2015 about 84 percent of older adults received a pen-
sion. Two benefits are important to reach the populations that are hard to
cover with purely contributory benefits: a social assistance pension (Bene-
fício de Prestação Continuada—BPC) and a Rural Pension (Previdência Rural).4
Following the 1988 Constitution, both benefits were set at the value of the
minimum wage, which is the minimum amount for all types of pensions in
Brazil.
In the case of Uruguay, old-age pension coverage rates have long been
high. A noncontributory pension program was created in 1919 (Amarante
and Vigorito 2012; Bertranou, Solorio, and van Ginneken 2002), but the
large majority of pensioners have a contributory benefit. From 2005, the
government has tried to expand coverage of older adults in various ways:
first, through the Plan de Equidad Social and the creation of a new noncon-
tributory subsidy for older adults without pensions at ages 65–69 (which
complements the existing noncontributory old-age pension for persons 70
and over), and second, through a reform of the contributory pension system
that made access more flexible, reducing the minimum number of contri-
bution years required and creating facilities for women with children and
for persons of advanced age, among other measures (Papadópulos 2013,
478–480).
Thus, with a range of instruments, applied on structurally different
pension systems, these four countries share three key features. First, they
are among the best achievers in terms of old-age coverage (with total old-
age coverage rates above 80 percent). Second, in all of them, contributory
pension coverage represents a high share of total coverage. Finally, the ben-
efit amounts that they offer to older adults with no contribution records are
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above the Latin American average and higher than the basic benefits in
every other country included in this article.
Universal minimal
In most other Latin American countries, contributory pension coverage is
significantly lower than in those discussed above. Therefore, these countries
have relied more heavily on noncontributory pensions to expand cover-
age. A couple of them have even implemented universal or pension-tested
noncontributory benefits aimed at the entire population of older adults
(Bolivia) or at every older adult with no other pension (Mexico), without
focusing on the poor or extremely poor only.5 Since contributory pension
coverage in these countries is low, noncontributory programs provide the
majority of benefits. However, benefit amounts are very modest (hence the
label “Universal Minimal”).
The case of Bolivia is particularly interesting, because the univer-
sal pension reaches almost every older adult in the country. The first
universal pension was established in 1996/97 as part of the structural
reform of the contributory pension system. That benefit, called Bono Soli-
dario (or Bonosol) was created with the aim to distribute the public shares
of capitalized (i.e., partly privatized) public companies among the popu-
lation. Bonosol would fulfil that aim by entitling all Bolivians who were
aged 21 or older by 1995 (when those companies were privatized) to a
benefit as of age 65 (Aponte 2006; Molina 2006; Müller 2009). In 2007,
President Evo Morales expanded the universal pension system, replacing
Bonosol with Renta Dignidad, a benefit that maintained several key fea-
tures of Bonosol but was largely financed by hydrocarbons tax revenues,
had a lower age of eligibility (60 instead of 65), and no cohort restric-
tion. Coverage increased from 78 percent of older adults aged 65 and
over in 2003 to 96 percent in 2015, and the yearly benefit amount rose
from about US$237 to about US$564 (or US$43 per month, plus a 13th-
month payment) in 2017.6 Despite that increase, the benefit value remains
comparatively low.
In Mexico, current old-age pension coverage rates are the outcome of
a process that started with the creation of a universal pension for residents
of Mexico City in 2001. This policy was followed by another noncontribu-
tory and non–means-tested benefit (70 y más), which was first established
in 2007 for older adults in rural areas and small towns and was later ex-
panded to urban areas (Flores-Castillo 2013). From 2013, the Older Adults’
Pension was established as a noncontributory benefit for Mexicans aged
65 and older who have no other pension. By 2014, noncontributory pen-
sions covered 52 percent of older adults (and paid more than 5.7 million
benefits in 2015; CEPAL 2017b), well above the 26 percent coverage rate of
contributory pension benefits (IDB 2017).7
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In both Bolivia andMexico, noncontributory benefits have a high cov-
erage rate and, together with contributory pensions, cover the majority of
the population (almost every older adult in Bolivia, due to the universal
design, and about 73 percent of them in Mexico). However, in both cases,
noncontributory benefit amounts are very modest and well below contrib-
utory benefits. This also contributes to explaining why labor force partici-
pation rates of the older population remain high in both countries (espe-
cially in Bolivia) and are substantially higher than in Argentina or Brazil
(see below). Besides that, the choice of universal (or pension-tested) ben-
efits in both countries (rather than means-tested pensions, which was the
most common choice in other countries) makes them part of a particularly
broad-ranging coverage expansion strategy.
Means-tested poverty relief
Most other countries that expanded old-age pension coverage opted for
benefits targeted to older adults living in poverty or extreme poverty. These
programs are means-tested, are separate from the contributory pension sys-
tem, and pay low benefits. Some emerged as a part or complement of other
social assistance programs, as was the case in Ecuador (Bono de Desarrollo
Humano), Colombia, and Peru (Juntos) (Albornoz and Oleas 2013; Lavigne
2013; Mina Rosero 2013, 15). Those are examples of relatively wide pro-
grams, but in other countries, like El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras,
noncontributory pensions have a more limited scope, in terms of both cov-
erage and the resources involved (Mesa-Lago 2012a).
Colombia is a good example of a coverage expansion strategy based on
means-tested benefits. The contributory pension system in Colombia has
long had limited coverage. A structural pension reform in 1993/94 intro-
duced a system of individual accounts operating in parallel to a reformed
public system. Despite some increase over the past decade, coverage of con-
tributory pensions remained low, and by 2016, benefits reached only about
27 percent of older adults (IDB 2017). Over recent years, policies to ex-
pand old-age coverage included both contribution subsidies and social as-
sistance. The Program for Social Protection of Older Adults (PPSAM, for the
acronym in Spanish), which was created in 2004, started a steady expan-
sion of noncontributory pensions, offering modest means-tested benefits
paid bimonthly (Rofman 2013; Villar et al. 2015).
In 2012, another means-tested program, Colombia Mayor, replaced the
PPSAM. The mechanism for selecting new beneficiaries prioritizes those
who are oldest and most vulnerable; in practice, most beneficiaries are
women and belong to the oldest age-groups (Villar et al. 2015, 49). Despite
the development of this program, which in 2016 paid about 1.5 million
benefits (CEPAL 2017b), the coverage gap remains large, and many older
adults still receive no benefits. It is estimated that in 2017, Colombia Mayor
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benefited about one-quarter of older adults.8 Thus, contributory and non-
contributory programs jointly offer benefits to just over half of the elderly
population. The benefits paid by Colombia Mayor are very modest, however,
and the program is separate from the contributory pension system.
Other countries in this group share with Colombia the key features of
this model (i.e., means-tested benefits of low amounts directed to the poor-
est older adults). In other words, this is a pension coverage strategy that does
not guarantee full coverage or adequate benefits, but which has expanded
access to cash benefits among older adults considerably in some countries.
Countries pursuing this strategy can be more or less ambitious in terms of
coverage, and indeed, coverage rates vary widely across countries in this
group; in all cases, though, a considerable share of the elderly population
continues to receive no benefit. These countries also have an institutionally
segmented system of old age protection, consisting of a contributory pension
system for formal workers and a separate system of noncontributory cash
transfers for the elderly poor (similar to other social assistance programs,
such as conditional cash transfer programs).9
Coverage, adequacy, retirement choices, and
living arrangements of older persons
The three old-age coverage strategies presented above help to conceptu-
alize the wide cross-country variation of both coverage and generosity of
pension benefits. To capture the degree of progress in these two dimensions
jointly, Figure 1 presents a purpose-built measure—the “index of basic old
age protection”—that combines coverage rates with the benefit generosity
of noncontributory pensions. The aim is to incorporate the differences in
noncontributory benefit amounts into the comparative analysis of old-age
pension coverage strategies. This measure is calculated by weighting non-
contributory coverage with the benefit level, so that if coverage is high but
the benefit amount is low, the index will take on a proportionally lower
value.10 The indicator ranges from 0 to 1 (lower values indicate lower cov-
erage, lower noncontributory benefits, or both) and focuses on basic protec-
tion, rather than on income replacement or adequacy for the full satisfaction
of older adults’ needs.
Among the 14 Latin American countries included in this article, the
best-situated are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay. These countries,
all in the “Contributory Plus” cluster, achieve high coverage rates with a
wider contributory pension system and relatively better benefits than their
neighbors for the population with no access to contributory pensions. Other
countries with wide noncontributory pension coverage but low benefits,
such as Bolivia, Mexico, and Peru, rate lower in terms of this indicator.11 In
practice, this measure is also associated to the country’s income level and
reflects the pension system’s degree of development: countries that perform
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FIGURE 1 Index of basic old-age protection, 14 Latin American countries
NOTES: Data are estimated based on coverage rates and benefit amounts corresponding to the year 2016,
except for Costa Rica (benefit amount for 2015); Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Panama, and
Paraguay (coverage rates for 2015), and Mexico (coverage rate for 2014). In cases where noncontributory
benefits with different amounts exist, estimations take the maximum benefit amount. Benefits were
converted to US$-PPP using the World Bank conversion factors (World Bank 2018).
For Argentina, coverage under a noncontributory pension is own estimation for pension moratorium
coverage based on the coverage goal in the national budget for 2015 (Ministerio de Economía 2015).
Benefit level is estimated for March 2016 based on MTESS (2016).
For Brazil, for the purposes of this estimation, the rural pension is taken as a noncontributory benefit, and
coverage is estimated based on the number of rural pensions as a percentage of total retirement pensions in
January 2017 (MPS 2017).
For Colombia, coverage under the noncontributory pension Colombia Mayor is own estimation based on
household survey data (DANE 2017) for April 2017.
For Guatemala, coverage under a noncontributory pension is estimated from administrative data (number
of benefits paid in 2016, from CEPAL 2017b) and population projections (benefits over population aged 65
and over) (CEPAL 2017a).
For Uruguay, coverage rates are based on BPS (2017a), Table C.1, p. 125, and BPS (2017b), Table IV.7.
SOURCES: Elaborated by the author based on data from IDB (2017) for coverage rates and CEPAL (2017b)
for benefit amounts, except otherwise indicated in the notes.
better are those that Carmelo Mesa-Lago (1986) long ago classified as “pio-
neer” countries in social security development.
This indicator provides a more complete picture of old-age protection
than coverage rates alone. Taking the analysis further, we can look be-
yond pension policies. In line with the welfare regimes approach (Esping-
Andersen 1990, 1999, and related literature), we could explore the relative
roles of states, markets, and families in providing old-age protection. For
this purpose, this article looks at two indicators of the roles of markets and
families, respectively, and evaluates how they are associated with the index
of basic old age protection (our main indicator of the state’s role). Specifi-
cally, labor force participation in old age is taken as an indicator of the role
of the market and living arrangements of older adults as an indicator of the
role of the family.12
As the empirical literature has shown, states, markets, and fami-
lies influence and complement each other in the production of welfare.
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Historically, pension systems had an effect on the roles of markets and fam-
ilies in providing economic security in old age. By intervening in choices
between work and retirement, pension systems contributed to shaping peo-
ple’s life courses, creating a predictable sequence and timing between work
and retirement (Kohli 2007). In countries with wide-ranging pension sys-
tems, pensions play a key role in the institutionalization of retirement as a
normal stage in the life course, to be both expected and possible, because a
benefit entitlement replaces earnings from work. At the same time, in those
cases, pension systems also contributed to making older adults econom-
ically more autonomous from both families and markets, facilitating the
spread of independent living arrangements observable in most developed
countries.
In Latin America, however, in a context of segmented and exclusion-
ary labor markets and widespread informal work, a similar economic au-
tonomy in old age has not been possible for a majority of older adults who
do not have access to adequate pension benefits. The possibility of retire-
ment is thus restricted to some individuals (formal-sector workers), and the
rest must either continue working or depend on family support during old
age. As discussed in the previous section, noncontributory pensions have
expanded coverage, but in most countries the amounts paid are too low
to fully cover an elderly person’s consumption needs. Therefore, many of
these benefitsmay provide some economic support but not enough for older
adults to retire from the labor force.
Labor force participation rates among older adults remain high in
countries where pension coverage is low, as well as in countries where pen-
sion coverage is high but basic pension benefits are low, such as Bolivia,
Ecuador, and Peru. Figure 2 shows that labor force participation rates for
the population aged 65 and over correlate with our measure of basic old age
protection, and Table 3 illustrates the distribution of countries across these
two variables. In countries with a lower index of basic old age protection,
more older adults are in the labor force. Retirement is not a “normal” stage
in the life course for all, and especially not for men and for the rural pop-
ulation, who are more likely to stay in the labor force after age 65 (CEPAL
2017c, 47). Analyses based on household survey data also suggest that older
adults continue to participate in the labor force even after receiving non-
contributory pensions. In the case of Colombia, scholars have observed that
older adults living in households receiving a noncontributory benefit have
labor force participation rates that are high and similar to those of older
adults living in nonbeneficiary households (Rofman 2013, 215, based on
data from 2010–2012). Thus, the market (i.e. the labor market) still plays
a significant role in providing income during old age in these countries: it
is often not the formal labor market with associated social security rights,
but the informal and more precarious labor market that employs most older
lower-income workers in Latin America.
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FIGURE 2 Percentage of the population aged 65 and older participating
in the labor force, by index of basic old age protection
NOTES: Data for 2016, except for Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Panama, and Paraguay (2015), and
Mexico (2014).
SOURCES: Elaborated by the author based on data from Figure 1 and on IDB (2017) for labor force
participation rates.
TABLE 3 Labor force participation in old age and index of basic old age
protection: Placement of specific countries
Index of basic old age protectionLabor force
participation
rate (ages 65








Very low Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Uruguay
Costa Rica
NOTES: Index of basic old age protection: High (> 0.700), middle (0.501–0.700), low (0.250–0.500), very low
(< 0.250).
Labor market participation rates among older adults (65+): High (>35%), middle (27–35%), low (20–26%),
very low (<20%).
SOURCES: Elaborated by the author based on data from Figures 1 and 2.
On the other hand, families have always been and continue to be a
fundamental pillar of old-age protection, providing economic support and
care based on bonds of kinship, mutual affection, reciprocity, and long-
standing social norms. In countries with comprehensive pension systems,
families continue to be important, but the kinds of help provided may shift
(toward types of support other than economic) or may even change direc-
tion, as scholars have observed in Europe when looking at intergenerational
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transfers of time and money from older adults to their children and grand-
children (e.g., Kohli 1999; Kohli and Albertini 2007).
One dimension of old age that varies widely across countries, based
on countries’ income level and social security development, is older adults’
living arrangements. As pension systems develop and provide wider and
more adequate coverage, older adults have more possibilities to live inde-
pendently from their children, either alone or with their spouse. Similarly,
as more do so (or have the expectation to do so), social demands for ade-
quate pensions are likely to grow, stimulating further pension system de-
velopment. Indeed, around the world, we see this pattern: most developed
countries in North America and Europe, with comprehensive pension sys-
tems and aging population structures, have a higher share of older adults
living independently. A recent study conducted by the United Nations Pop-
ulation Division shows stark differences in the prevalence of independent
living arrangements for older adults around the world (from over 70 per-
cent in Europe and Northern America to 33 percent in Latin America and
the Caribbean, and even less in Asia and Africa) (United Nations 2017, 18).
The study also shows a trend toward independent living and away from in-
tergenerational coresidence in all regions, along with the resilience of tradi-
tional family structures in middle- and lower-income countries, where the
dominant living arrangement for older persons continues to be coresidence
with their children.13
Previous studies looking at living arrangements of older persons in
Latin America have shown that living arrangements are associated with in-
come levels both across and within countries: coresidence is less common
among older adults in richer countries, as well as in higher-income house-
holds across countries (OECD 2014, 23–24). Our analysis also shows that
in Latin America, the incidence of independent living among older adults
correlates with the index of basic old age protection (Figure 3). Countries
where pension systems offer broader coverage and more adequate basic
benefits also have a higher share of older adults living independently. This
exploratory finding suggests an interaction between family arrangements
(and the role of the family in providing for old-age protection) and public
policies for old-age security, including all types of pensions. This finding is
also consistent with the welfare regimes literature in Latin America, which
has stressed the key role of families in compensating for the lack of adequate
state provision, especially in countries with exclusionary welfare regimes,
where the presence of the state is very limited and labor markets are highly
segmented and unequal (Martinez Franzoni 2008). As Figure 4 shows, the
index of basic old age protection also tends to be higher in countries where
population aging is more advanced.
Overall, these findings suggest the existence of different old-age
regimes in Latin America—one for countries with more comprehensive
pension systems, where older adults have lower labor force participation
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FIGURE 3 Percentage of population aged 60 and older living
independently (alone or with spouse), by index of basic old age
protection
NOTES: Living independently includes persons living alone or with a spouse. Latest data available,
corresponding to c. 2010–2015 for all countries except for Chile and Paraguay (2002) and El Salvador
(2007). The index of basic old age protection is for c. 2016 (see details in notes to Figure 1).
SOURCES: Elaborated by the author based on data from Figure 1 and on United Nations (2017) for living
arrangements.
FIGURE 4 Percentage of population aged 65 and older, by index of basic
old age protection.
NOTE: Population in ages 65 and over as a percentage of the total population estimated for 2015. Index of
basic old age protection is for c. 2016 (see details in notes to Figure 1).
SOURCES: Elaborated by the author based on data from Figure 1 and on CEPAL (2017a) for population aged
65 and older.
and more independent living arrangements, and in which the aging process
is more advanced (higher income countries in terms of per capita GDP);
and another for countries with more limited pension systems (in terms
of both coverage and adequacy), where older adults are more likely to
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participate in the labor force after the normal retirement age and less likely
to live independently, and where the aging process is less advanced. Further
research should deepen this analysis to incorporate more indicators of the
strategies of old-age security and evaluate the implications that alternative
state-market-family arrangements can have for social development.
Final remarks
Over the past two decades, many Latin American countries have expanded
benefits oriented to providing economic support to older adults who are
not receiving contributory pension benefits. Some countries have achieved
high coverage rates by complementing contributory pensions with noncon-
tributory benefits. A few countries adopted a universal or pension-tested
model, achieving high coverage with modest benefits. Most other countries
implemented means-tested benefits, directed solely to the elderly poor and
administered separately from contributory pensions. Through the system-
atic assessment of the main policy instruments for coverage expansion, this
article has identified three models that characterize countries’ strategies for
old-age basic economic security.
Two types of countries achieved the highest rates of old-age pension
coverage: (1) countries where the aging process is more advanced and
the social security system was already widely developed before recent ex-
pansion (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay), and (2) countries with
low contributory coverage that implemented modest universal (or pension-
tested) benefits (Bolivia and Mexico), rather than adopting the more com-
mon option of means-tested benefits for the elderly poor. Coverage also
increased in some countries with a more residual approach to basic pen-
sions, in which benefits are low and means-tested and coverage gaps in
most cases remain large. Despite coverage expansion, most noncontribu-
tory pension programs in Latin America still offer very low benefits. As we
have shown, the joint assessment of coverage (contributory and noncon-
tributory) and basic benefit adequacy offers a more complete picture of the
levels of old-age protection achieved across countries than does analysis of
coverage rates alone.
The findings in this article also confirm the interaction in the roles
of states, markets, and families in providing old-age economic security. In
countries where public old-age protection systems are weak (in terms of
both coverage and adequacy), older adults are more likely to remain in the
labor force after the legal retirement age and are less likely to live inde-
pendently. This suggests that different old-age regimes exist in the region,
each with a different balance in the roles of states, markets, and families to
provide economic security in old age.
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Notes
An earlier version of this article was pre-
pared within the United Nations University
World Institute for Development Economics
Research (UNU-WIDER) project on “The Po-
litical Economy of Social Protection Systems”
and was published as a working paper (Arza
2017a). This revised and expanded version
includes a wider discussion of coverage, ba-
sic benefit adequacy and old-age patterns.
The author gratefully acknowledges financial
support from UNU-WIDER for the original
paper on which this article is based and from
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científi-
cas y Técnicas (CONICET) for longer-term re-
search on noncontributory pensions in Latin
America.
1 Some authors call these programs
“semi-contributory” to account for these par-
ticularities (e.g. Bertranou et al. 2011). In this
article, I consider them as a coverage expan-
sion program, together with noncontributory
pensions, due to their similar aim and impact:
the extension of benefits to older adults who
do not meet the contributory requirements
for ordinary pensions.
2 Both have just above-average basic
benefit amounts, and mid-range contribu-
tory and total old-age coverage.
3 Own calculation, based on the na-
tional budget, including old-age and sur-
vivors’ pensions (see Ministerio de Economía
2015).
4 The rural pension (previdência rural)
is based on a special regulation (segurado es-
pecial) for farmers working individually or
in small family farm production, and subsis-
tence fishermen, who do not need to have a
record of contributions to obtain a pension.
These workers do not pay a contribution on
earned income. Instead, the purchaser of the
rural product must pay a contribution of 2.2
percent of the sales price (Schwarzer and
Querino 2002, 10). Coverage data presented
in this article are based on IDB (2017) and in-
clude rural pension coverage. Unfortunately,
IDB (2017) does not report noncontributory
pension coverage separately for Brazil (BPC),
and we lack data from other sources to fill
that gap.
5 Palacios and Knox-Vydmanov (2014)
suggest that for some purposes, universal and
pension-tested benefits can be analyzed to-
gether as part of a similar family of non–
means-tested benefits aiming at full cover-
age.
6 Latest value, based on Law 953 of year
2017 and converted to US$ using the ex-
change rate of June 1, 2017.
7 After finishing this article, Mexico an-
nounced a reform of noncontributory pen-
sions to make them universal and increase
the benefit amount (see Mexican Govern-
ment 2019). That reform is beyond the scope
of this article, but it does not alter the posi-
tion of the country as here described.
8 Own calculation, based on GEIH
(DANE, 2017). CEPAL estimates a similar
coverage rate (27 percent) based on admin-
istrative data for 2016 (CEPAL 2017b).
9 Rofman, Apella, and Vezza (2013, 39-
40) also find that in all of these cases, benefits
are separate rather than integrated into tra-
ditional pension institutions.
10 In contrast, contributory coverage is
taken as given because these programs nor-
mally have minimum benefit regulations.
The calculation formula is as follows: covcp
+ covnc * (min (ben/minben), 1); where covcp
is the coverage rate of the contributory pen-
sion, covnc is the coverage rate of the noncon-
tributory pension, ben is the monthly benefit
amount of noncontributory pension in US$-
PPP, andminben is theminimummonthly ba-
sic benefit adequacy target, set at US$-PPP
450 (i.e., 15 US$-PPP per day). This mini-
mum adequacy threshold is consistent with
the minimum income that Ferreira et al.
(2013) deem necessary to place a household
in the “middle class” (i.e., neither poor or
vulnerable, nor rich)—that is, a per capita in-
come of US$10–US$50 per day (2005 US$
PPP).
11 In their study of noncontributory
pensions in Latin America, Rofman, Apella,
and Vezza (2015) argue that benefit ade-
quacy relates to the goal of universality, in
such a way that countries aiming to reach
universal coverage have higher benefits.
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They note, however, that this does not apply
for two cases—Bolivia andMexico. In this ar-
ticle, those two countries fit into a separate
group, “Universal Minimal,” which captures
the particularity of these countries to have
very high coverage and low benefits. As a re-
sult, these countries also have a lower value
in the index of basic old age protection than
other countries with similarly high total old-
age coverage.
12 These indicators do not tap all possi-
ble dimensions of market and family’s roles
(nor does pension policy cover all dimen-
sions of the state’s role), but they are effec-
tive means to explore interactions and com-
plementarities that exist in different strate-
gies for old-age income security.
13 Co-residence with children may also
be influenced by the possibility of young
adults’ forming their own households inde-
pendently from their parents. Measuring the
incidence of this factor is, however, beyond
the scope of this article.
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